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I. INTRODUCTION

Controversies about the relationship between church and state are at
least as old as the Bible. In a familiar story, the Pharisees and Herodians
tried to trap Jesus by asking him whether it was lawful to pay taxes to the
secular government. Jesus replied, "Render to Caesar the things that are
Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's."'
That canny response did not finally resolve church-state debates.
Centuries later, when the American colonies were settled, the
controversies were especially vehement. England had an established
church,2 and many colonists emigrated from England seeking liberty to
practice religion freely.' When the colonists adopted their Constitution,
they insisted on an amendment to prevent the national government from
establishing a religion.4 Today, the Church of England remains
established, but the degree of its connection to the state has diminished.
Meanwhile, a "culture war"5 in the United States generates heated
discussion about the appropriate degree of separation between church and
state, with some preferring a wall between the two and others arguing that
the United States should permit more governmental religious expression.
This Article will analyze the two nations' current approaches to church
and state through recent cases on the subject. Part II analyzes recent cases
in each country, and Part Ill draws comparisons and contrasts between the
countries' contemporary approaches to church-state issues. It concludes
that the two countries, once so far apart, are moving closer to each other
on the issue of establishment.

1. Mark 12:17 (King James). The same story appears in Matthew 22:21 and Luke 20:25.
2. See Sarah M. Montgomery, Note, Drawing the Line: the Civil Courts' Resolution of
Church PropertyDisputes,the EstablishedChurchandAll Saints 'EpiscopalChurch, Waccamaw,
54 S.C. L. REv. 203,207 (2002).
3. DANIEL L. DREISBACH, RELIGION & PoLIcs iN THE EARLY REPuBLIc 151 (Daniel L.

Dreisbach ed., 1996); see also Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)
(stating, "A large portion of the settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the
bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend favored churches.").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see JOSEPH STORY, II COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 606-07 (Little Brown & Co. 1873) (explaining that religious freedom was
important to the Founders because of their previous experience of bigotry and intolerance).
5. See JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA

42 (199 1) (defining the cultural conflict as "political and social hostility rooted in different systems
of moral understanding.").
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II. CHURCH AND STATE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES AS SEEN
THROUGH RECENT CASES

A. England
1. Background
Unlike the situation in the United States, where the concept of
establishment has been the subject of a significant body of jurisprudence
and academic interpretation, in the United Kingdom (and more generally
within Europe), "establishment" is not a legal term of art but a general
description of a state of affairs. As such, it does not have the status of a
legal principle to be enforced by the courts.6 Further, insofar as it is a
general description, it is so vague as to be unhelpful in providing clarity
as to the nature of Church/State relationships in a particular case. Within
the United Kingdom, there are two established churches (the Church of
England and the Church of Scotland) and two churches, each of which has
been formally disestablished but retains the characteristics of a "national
church" (the Church of Ireland and the Church in Wales).7 The legal nature
of the Church of England is very different from that of the Church of
Scotland, as are the implications of establishment. Very generally,
however, establishment has been defined as a situation where one church
has official recognition or approval above other religions8 and a different
status in the Constitution. Given the differences within the United
Kingdom in the way in which establishment is expressed, this Article will
focus on the law of England only.
The historical core of English establishment is the fact that the Head of
State (the reigning monarch) is also the head of the established Church.
The significance of this has diminished as the role of the monarch within
the British constitution9 has diminished. In the seventeenth century,
establishment meant that the nation and the Church of England were

6. See Colin Munro, Does Scotland have an EstablishedChurch?, 4 Ecc. L.J. 639-45
(1997).
7. Id. (pointing out that there is some dispute in Scotland as to the establishment or
otherwise of the Church of Scotland, thus demonstrating the vagueness of the concept in
constitutional terms. He argues that as, unlike Wales and Ireland, Scotland has never formally
disestablished the Church, it must still be considered established.).
8. It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply disapproval of other religions.
9. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, Britain's constitution is unwritten, consisting ofassemblage
of laws, institutions and customs that govern the country. See Michael Burgess, Constitutional
Changein the UnitedKingdom: New Model orMereRespray?, 40 S.TEX. L. REV. 715, 717 (1999).
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unified.' Consequently, dissent was punished as disloyal and seditious.
While Protestant dissent came to be tolerated," Roman Catholic dissent
was much more severely treated precisely because it involved not only a
lack of loyalty towards the English nation but potentially sympathy and
unity with other, Roman Catholic nations. 2
However, this understanding has developed considerably.
Theologically and ecclesiologically, the contemporary Church of England
is not understood as constituting or united to the nation, but as a Church
of baptized Christians with a particular duty of service to the nation. 3
Within England (and indeed within the rest of the United Kingdom) the
relationship between the established church and the legal system is best
summed up by the following words of Munby J in Suleiman v. Juffali:
Although historically this country is part of the Christian west, and
although it has an established church which is Christian, I sit as a
secular judge serving a multi-cultural community of many faiths in
which all of us can now take pride, sworn to do justice "to all
manner of people." Religion-whatever the particular believer's
faith-is no doubt something to be encouraged but it is not the
business of government or of the secular courts. So the starting
point of the law is an essentially agnostic view of religious beliefs
and a tolerant indulgence to religious and cultural diversity. A
secular judge must be wary of straying across the well-recognised

10. Referred to by Avis as the Erastian Paradigm, Erastianism is a ecclesiological model
which acknowledges that the State has a role in spiritual as well as temporal governance. PAUL
Avis, ANGLICANISM AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH: THEOLOGICAL RESOURCES IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE (1989).
11. The Toleration Act of 1688 permitted nonconformist Protestant religious groups to meet
for worship, with the proviso (still in force) that worship must not take place behind locked doors.
12. See 1 KENNETH HYLSON-SMITH, THE CHURCHES IN ENGLAND FROM EuZABETH I TO
ELIZABETH 11 (1996), ch. 4. Of course, as this account makes clear, the involvement of Roman
Catholics in plots to overthrow the reigning monarchs throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries (most notably the so-called Babbington plot to bring Mary Queen of Scots to the throne
in 1586 and the Gunpowder plot, led by Guy Fawkes, to blow up the Houses of Parliament in 1605)
as well as the active complicity and encouragement which they received from the Vatican and from
France in particular did much to encourage this perception.
13. See PAULAVIS, CHRISTIANSINCOMMUNION (1990). See also Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali's
observation that "the Church of England, in particular, welcomes its special place in society, but
it must see that place as a place for service and not for rule. It must see its role in establishment,
for example, as the desire of the state and the people in this country to hear the voice of the church
in national affairs." A Spiritual and Moral Framework for Society, in CHURCH, STATE AND
RELiGIOUS MINORITIES 31-35 (Tariq Modood ed., 1997).
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divide between church and state. It is not for a judge to weigh one
religion against another. All are entitled to equal respect, whether
4
in times of peace or, as at present, amidst the clash of arms.'
There are two significant things about this statement worth noting at
this stage. Firstly, it reflects the conviction that establishment does not
involve giving a preferential position to Christians and to members of the
Church of England. Active religious discrimination, of the type that was
in place in the seventeenth century, was slowly abolished over the
nineteenth century.'5 The only vestige which remains is that the Monarch
must be a member of the established churches and may not be married to
a Roman Catholic.'
Secondly, however, Munby J points to one of the key features of
establishment, which is that religion is actively considered to be a positive
thing which should be supported by the State. This contrasts with the
position of neutrality taken in other European countries such as France,
where religion (or other philosophical positions such as atheism) is to be
considered neither positive nor negative.' 7 One clear example of this
attitude within the British legal system is the law of charities, where a trust
set up for religious purposes is automatically considered to be of public
value and, therefore, entitled to charitable status. 8
14. 1 FLR 479, 490 (2002). The case considered whether a Muslim talaq divorce could be
recognized in UK family law.
15. Following the Toleration Act 1688, the most significant developments were the 1828
repeal of both the 1661 Corporation Act (requiring all those holding civic office to be
communicants of the Church of England) and the 1673 Test Act (which required all those holding
civic or military office to be communicants of the Church of England and to denounce the doctrine
of transubstantiation); the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act (which allowed Roman Catholics to
enter Parliament) and the 1871 abolition of religious tests for entrance to the universities of Oxford
and Cambridge.
16. This provision was first enshrined in English law by the Act ofSettlement 1700, intended
to clarify the succession following the departure of the recently converted Roman Catholic King
James II and the arrival of his Protestant heirs William and Mary. It states that every person who
"should be reconciled to or shall hold communion with the see or church of Rome or should
professe the popish religion or marry a papist" should be excluded from the line of succession to
the Crown.
17. See, e.g., CE 17/6/1988 Union des ath6es req. no 63912 AJDA 1988 612, 582 (denying
the French Union of Atheists, which denied them the status of an association in the public interest).
18. See Lord Macnaghten's classification ofcharitable purposes in CommissionersofSpecial
Income Tax vPemsel [1891] A.C. 531. Religious purposes include not only the work of the major
Christian denominations, but also smaller fringe groups. Thornton v Howe, 21 Beav. 41 (1862)
(concerning a trust for the publication of the works of Joanna Southcott, who believed that she
would give birth to a new Messiah and non-Christian religions (e.g., Neville Estates, Ltd. v.
Madden [1962] ch. 832)). In Neville Estates, Judge Cross observed that "[a]s between different
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More generally, however, a central feature of establishment in England
is that the Church of England is given by the state the symbolic function
of making religion present within public life. This is partly visible in the
context of civic religion: significant events in the life of the nation are
often marked by church services organized by the Church of England, in
the Anglican mold, but with the participation of other denominations and
faiths. 19 Thus, a further principle of establishment can be understood as an
acknowledgement of the public role of religion and a resistance to it being
seen as a part of the private life only of an individual.
More concretely, there are a number of constitutional implications. As
mentioned above, the monarch must be a member of the Church of
England (and of the Church of Scotland) and cannot be married to a
Roman Catholic. There are seats within the House of Lords ° for a number
of bishops of Church of England.2 In some areas, acts of the Church of
England Synod must be approved by Parliament, although this tends to be
a formality.22 Finally, and in some ways most significantly, bishops and
archbishop of the Church of England are chosen by the Queen on the

religions, the law stands neutral, but it assumes that any religion is at least likely to be better than
none" and non-theistic philosophical positions do not get the same treatment. Neville [1962] ch.
832.
19. See David McClean, The Changing Legal Framework ofEstablishment, 7 ECc. L.J. 292
(2004) (suggesting that the Church of England's responsibility to the nation is expressed in part
through these expressions of civic religion). Parekh has suggested that the existence of an
established church in England is a way of giving religion a public presence but making it subject
to public responsibility. Bhikhu Parekh, Religion and Public Life, in CHURCH, STATE AND
REuGIOUS MINORITIES, supra note 13, at 16-22.
20. The House of Lords is the nonelected Second Chamber of Parliament, currently
comprising a mixture of hereditary and nominated members. Reforms have been proposed to
abolish the membership of hereditary peers, but these have hit political difficulties. The Judicial
Committee of the House of Lords, comprised only of experienced nominated judges, acts as the
highest court in the UK legal system.
21. The current count is twenty-six, out of one hundred and fourteen Church of England
bishops in total. The membership of the House of Lords is not capped, and currently stands at seven
hundred and twenty-three members.
22. The most infamous example of Parliamentary interference was the rejection of the 1928
revision of the Book of Common Prayer. See J.R.H. MOORMAN, A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN
ENGLAND 427 (3d ed. 1972). See also MONICA FURLONG, C OF E: THE STATE IT'S IN235 (2000)
(debating on the ordination of women, with the "laughable spectacle of, on the one hand, the Revd
Ian Paisley (a noted Ulster Presbyterian politician) explaining why the Church of England should
not ordain women, and, on the other, the almost equally absurd phenomenon of a clutch of willing
women Labour MPs, with only the dimmest understanding of how the church worked, explaining
why they should.").
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advice of the Prime Minister.23 The primary implication of establishment
in England is, therefore, not one of influence of the Church in affairs of
state. The Bishops do have influence in parliamentary debates and often
participate in a wide range of debates, as part of their role to maintain the
visibility of the spiritual and ethical dimension.24 Cranmer has observed
that the influence of the Church is not in terms of what it says but what it
does.25 There is little or no attempt by the Church to require, as a corollary
of establishment, compliance with Christian doctrine or a moral code
throughout society; while part of the visibility of the Church involves
making public pronouncements on such issues, that is in the interest of
making a voice heard, rather than enforcing compliance. In fact, one of the
benefits of establishment has in some quarters been perceived as the
maintenance of the Church of England as a moderate, nondogmatic and
pragmatic Church.26 There is generally speaking little or no controversy or
debate about this form of public religious expression.
While English establishment appears to require the state publicly to
acknowledge the existence and value of religion, it does not require the
state to impose religious belief, or any particular religious belief, on its
citizens. Notably, the existence of civic events of a religious, even
Christian, nature should not be interpreted as an attempt to force people
into a particular religious belief. There is something of a tradition within
the Church of England of distinguishing acts and beliefs, and of leaving
the matter of the conscience up to the individual. Historically, much of the
spirit of the contemporary Church of England and contemporary
establishment can be traced back to the time of Queen Elizabeth I, who
had lived through the heresy hunts of her sister (Mary I) and brother
(Edward VI). This did not mean that she was in favor of toleration of
nonconformism or of the Roman Catholic Church in England. She was a
subscriber to the view of the unity of Church and Monarch and thus saw

23. See Frank Cranmer, Church StateRelations in the UnitedKingdom: A Westminister View,
6 Ecc. L.J. 111 (2001) (suggesting that the Prime Minister rejected the original nominations put
forward for the bishopric of Liverpool.).
24. See, for example, the response of the Archbishops' Council ofthe Church of England to
the proposals for House of Lords reform, which observes that the role of the bishops in the House
is to act "as independent and authoritative voices able to draw together and articulate a range of
concerns and interests that may run the risk of being overlooked otherwise." Interestingly, the

Council actively supports representation ofother faiths and denominations. For details ofthe reform
process and copies of all the consultation responses, see http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitutionl
holref/holrefindex.htm.
25. Cranmer, supra note 23, at 112.
26. Sir John Laws, A Judicial Perspective on the Sacred in Society, 7 ECC. L.J. 317-27
(2004).
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nonconformity as sedition. However, what she was interested in was a
unity ofpractice and allegiance, rather than a unity of theology or personal
belief." Religious conformity, in Elizabethan times, was a way of
maintaining national cohesion around the twin pillars of the Monarch and
the Church.
This unity of practice, following the arrival of toleration and the
increasing multi-faith nature of British society, is no longer required to
demonstrate social cohesion.2" Establishment in the twenty-first century
does not tolerate discrimination against members of other religions or
denominations.
The United Kingdom is bound in international law by the European
Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 of which protects freedom of
thought, conscience and religion and Article 14 of which prohibits
discrimination on Convention grounds (including, therefore, on grounds
of religion). The Convention is enforceable in British courts following the
Human Rights Act of 1998 and Article 9 has been considered, but only
rarely have UK authorities been found to be in violation of the provision.
2. Recent Cases
a. Denbigh High School
A notable exception has been the recent case of R (on the application
of SB) v. Denbigh High School,29 concerning a schoolgirl who was
effectively excluded from school because of her choice to wear severe
Muslim dress. However, unlike comparable and well-reported cases in
other European countries, the basis of the exclusion was not a rule
prohibiting Muslim dress in school in order to maintain a secular or
Christian ethos. The school, like most British schools, imposed a uniform
requirement on pupils and, given the large Muslim population in the area,
the school uniform had been designed in consultation with a local mosque
to ensure that variants were available which suited Islamic dress code, thus
27. See HYLSON-SMITH, supra note 12, at 32 (arguing that "she [Elizabeth] did not want to
make windows into men's souls, but she did want to ensure as far as possible that whatever men
believed they should obey her government." Hylson-Smith also quotes her chief ministers, Sir
William Cecil, stating that "the state could never be in safety, where there was toleration of two
religions. For there is no enmity so great as that of religion, and they that differ in the service of

God, can never agree in the service of their country.").
28. It is perhaps arguable, however, that inter-faith activity is crucial to the maintenance of

social cohesion, as the centrality of religious leaders and inter-faith commemorations in the
aftermath of the July 2005 bombings in London have demonstrated.
29. 2 All ER 396 (2005).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/2
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encouraging a multicultural ethos within the school. The problem was that
the form of Islamic dress which the pupil wished to wear was more severe
than the one considered normative by the local Muslim leaders and thus
did not conform to the uniform. 30 The question before the court was
therefore not whether or not Islamic dress could be visible within the
school, but rather whether the individual convictions of the individual
should be allowed to prevail over a solution which had been reached
collectively." The judgment of the Court of Appeal was that it should, and
that religious freedom is a matter of individual conscience rather than
membership of a particular community involving compliance with its
norms. This represents perhaps the first acknowledgment by the English
Courts that religious freedom involves the individual conscience, rather
than participation in a particular collectivity. However, the co-existence of
this principle with an established church is beyond doubt.
On one level, therefore, establishment in England is about the Church
of England taking on a role in making visible and public the religious and
spiritual life of the nation, without imposing specifically Anglican, or even
Christian, beliefs or practices. Legally, however, there are more significant
links between the Church and State within the legal system. Part of
English establishment is that the Canon law of the Church of England is
the law of the land and can be enforced as such.32 This, in some contexts,
gives the civil courts jurisdiction in church matters.33 In practice, the
judiciary tends to be reticent in exercising their jurisdiction, but there are
times when it becomes inevitable. Two recent cases illustrate the impact
of this jurisdiction and the impact of establishment on the reasoning of the
courts. The central theme of both cases is the extent to which the Church
can be understood as a public institution.

30. Id. IM 31-47 (analyzing the two opposing theological positions on Islamic dress for

women which were found to be in conflict).
31. Id. 49 (stating that the appellant's freedom of religion had been violated, as she was
prohibited by the school from acting on her belief as to the proper dress code which she should
follow).

32. This state of affairs, arguably, is the last vestige of the Erastian paradigm, whereby the
State has a role in enforcing church order and where the law of the land was seen as having a
spiritual basis. According to the Elizabethan Richard Hooker: "the laws made by the monarch with
the consent of Parliament were in effect the laws of God for the people of England." FURLONG,
supra note 22, at 55-56.
33. See McClean, supra note 19 (arguing that the advantage of this arrangement is in
practical terms to act almost as a threat to parties before the ecclesiastical courts and thus to give
those courts their coercive jurisdiction. It is therefore not often necessary for the civil courts
actually to act.).
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b. Aston Cantlow
Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with BillesleyParochialChurch Council
v. Wallbank and Another"4 was brought by owners of a farm against the
Parochial Church Council of their local Church of England parish church.

The farm carried with it an ancient property encumbrance, enshrined in
legislation by the Chancel Repairs Act of 1932 but described in the
judgment of the House of Lords as "arcane and unsatisfactory"35 which
rendered them liable to pay for certain repairs within the parish church.3
The Parochial Church Council attempted to enforce this liability by
requiring payment for repairs worth nearly £100,000 and this was
challenged by the landowners.
The existence and application of the encumbrance was uncertain. 7
However, the applicant argued, among other things, that the obligation
was, in essence, a discriminatory tax and was thus contrary to the
European Convention on Human Rights, rendered enforceable in the
United Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998. The Human Rights Act
applies only to public bodies, and therefore, prior to any decisions as to
whether or not there was a violation, it needed to be established whether
or not the Parochial Church Council is a public body bound by the
provisions of the Human Rights Act.
The Court of Appeal held in its judgment that the P.C.C. is a public
body, bound by human rights legislation.38 It drew on the historical
relationship between Church and State and the intertwining of canon law
and common law to argue that the PCC of a Church of England church,
unlike the governing authorities of other denominations or faiths, has
powers available to it which are not available to private individuals.
Notably, the notice for repair which the council had issued to the applicant
had statutory force.39 As the judgment put it:

34. 1 AC 546 (2004).
2 (using the expressions "anachronistic" and
35. See Opinion of Lord Nicholl,
"capricious").
36. It was argued in the case that the historical basis for this right was that the property
owner, known as the lay rector, was entitled to receive tithes from the church.
37. The judgment of the Court of Appeal leant towards the view that the common law was
relatively clear, but that the application of the Human Rights Act confused matters. See [2002] ch.
51 24. The House of Lords did not make any assertions about the state of the law on chancel
repair.
38. Id. 35.
39. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/2
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[The PCC] is public in the sense that it is created and empowered
by law; that it forms part of the church by law established; and that
its functions include the enforcement through the courts of a
common law liability to maintain its chancels resting upon persons
who need not be members of the church.40
On that basis, extra power must give rise to the extra accountability which
the Human Rights Act provides. 4
While the principle of this seems reasonable, the implications were
considerable and the PCC appealed to the House of Lords as final court of
appeal.42 The House of Lords adopted a narrower interpretation of the
definition of a public authority, as a body linked to governmental
activities.43 This definition, it was argued, is limited to the applicability of
the Human Rights Act, rather than to the broader field ofjudicial review."

The PCC cannot be characterized as a body of a governmental nature, but
is primarily a religious organization and thus is defacto acting in a private

manner.4" The historical intertwining of canon and common law does not
change this. This argument explicitly discounted any particular impact of
the fact of establishment, and gave Church of England churches the same

status as any other church.' A significant reason for this was that, if a PCC
is a public authority it cannot, prima facie, claim the benefit of the Human

Rights Act in cases, for example of discrimination on grounds of
religion.47

40. Id.
41. It should be noted in particular that the Court of Appeal explicitly relied on the standard
case-law on the question ofpublic authorities in judicial review. See R v. Panel on Take-Overs and
Mergers, Ex p Datafin pic [ 1987] QB 815 134 (defining public authority broadly, in order to ensure
maximum accountability for decision-making with a public impact). Under the Datafinprinciple,
a body is a public authority when its activities have a public element to them and where its
jurisdiction is not limited to people who have entered into a contractual or consensual relationship
with it.
42. See Editorial Comments, 7 Ecc. L.J. 246 (2002) (criticizing the Court of Appeal's
judgment); I. Dawson & A. Dunn, Seeking the Principle:Chancels, Choices andHuman Rights,
22 L. STUD. 238-258. Criticisms focused on the use of the Datafin case law to define a public
authority.
43. See Opinion of Lord Nicholl, 17; Opinion of Lord Hope, 47.
44. See Opinion ofLord Nicholl, I 6 & 7 (linking his definition with state liability under the
European Convention on Human Rights). Id. 52 (criticizing the Court of Appeal for having
ignored the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the subject and having focused
solely on the domestic definition of public authority in the context ofjudicial review).
45. See id. 13.
46. See Opinion of Lord Hobhouse, 86.
47. See Opinion of Lord Nicholl, % 8 & 15.
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In a state where there is a clear separation between Church and State,
the question of whether or not a church council is public or private is
difficult to contest. In England, the debate arises because of the special
status given to the Church of England. However, as the disagreements
between the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords make clear, the
controversy lies in whether or not that special status is sufficient to place
State-like obligations on the Church. In the event, the final judgment made
is that the Church of England in this matter is no different from any other
religious organization, and that the appropriate solution would be for the
Chancel Repairs Act to be repealed by Parliament. However, in order to
find in this way, the House of Lords is obliged to discount the relationship
between canon law and common law which lies at the heart of
establishment." In so doing, they also emphasize that, while the Church
of England is by law established, it is not part of the governmental or
public authorities of the State, and its activities are to be understood as
religious matters rather than State matters.49
c. Bishop of Stafford
In some ways the water here is a little muddied through the existence
of a further judgment, which was not cited in Aston Cantlow but which
raises some of the same issues: R v. Bishop of Stafford ex parte Owen.50
This judgment concerned the status, not of a Church Council, but of the
decision-making power of a bishop. The Reverend Ray Owen sought
judicial review of the decision of his bishop not to extend his licence to
minister as Rector of a Team Ministry once he had reached the age of
sixty. The Court of Appeal relied on long-standing precedent that judicial
review is available in such circumstances, citing a number of apparently
unreported nineteenth century cases. However, it was argued for the
Bishop that judicial review was not available, relying on R v. ChiefRabbi
48. This is implicit in the rejection of the Court of Appeal's argument that a PCC may be a

public authority because its decisions can have statutory force.
49. See Opinion of Lord Hope,

61 (discussing establishment):

The state has not surrendered or delegated any of its functions or powers to the
Church. None of the functions that the Church of England performs would have
to be performed in its place by the state if the Church were to abdicate its
responsibility... The relationship which the state has with the Church of England
is one of recognition, not of the devolution to it of any of the powers or functions
of government.
50. AC 14 (2001). This judgment is not reported in any official reports, and is only available

in full via the Westlaw database. Pinpoint references are thus not available.
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of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the
Commonwealth ex parte Wachmann.5" This argument is consequently
based on an assumption that a bishop of the Church of England has the
same status as a leader of any religious community. Schieman observed,
in justifying his position that judicial review was available, that the
argument in favor of it is made much stronger by the fact that the Church
of England is an established church.
However, a reason behind this apparent lack of criticism of the
historical status quo can be found in the reference later in the judgment to
the fact that Church of England clergy have few employment rights and
that consequently the decision of the Bishop was one which would deprive
the Reverend Owen of his livelihood and against which there is no other
recourse.52 There is, therefore, a certain pragmatism in Ex parte Owen.
However, there is equally an explicit recognition that the history of
establishment means that the courts are given the power to control the
affairs of the Church of England at times, and will exercise that power
when it appears necessary, in the interests of justice to do so.
3. The Current State of English Establishment
Recent cases show that, while the Church of England has been
established for over four centuries, the essence and characteristics of that
establishment have changed considerably. Establishment does not imply
anything other than the full acceptance of religious diversity, and indeed
the United Kingdom is one of the most religiously diverse countries in
Europe. Further, while establishment involves a link between Church and
State, it no longer implies that Church and State are unified, or, generally
speaking, that the Church can be understood as a public body. Religious
and spiritual matters are part of public life, but it is the Church, and not the
government, which has the responsibility for ensuring that this happens.
B. The United States
1. Background
In adopting the Constitution, the founders of the United States insisted
on adding provisions to safeguard certain individual rights even when they

51. 1 WLR 1036 (1992).
52. See Diocese of Southwark v. Coker, ICR 140 (1998) (holding that parish clergy are not
employees and thus have no employment rights and cannot challenge an unfair dismissal in the
employment courts).
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were unpopular with the majority.53 The First Amendment safeguards
religious freedom through two companion clauses. The Establishment
Clause provides that "Congress shall pass no law respecting the
establishment of religion, 54 while the Free Exercise Clause balances this
by adding, "nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'5 As with most of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights, these protections were later held to
apply to the individual states and their political subdivisions by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment.56
In a 1971 Establishment Clause case, the Court developed what has
become known as the Lemon test.5 Lemon involved two state statutes, one
providing salary supplements for teachers in nonpublic schools and one
authorizing reimbursement of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructions materials.58 In evaluating the statutes' constitutionality, the
Court melded criteria from earlier cases into the following test: to be
Constitutional under the Establishment Clause, a government action must:
1) have a secular purpose, 2) have a primary effect that "neither advances
nor inhibits religion," and 3) avoid "'excessive government entanglement
with religion."' 59 The Court acknowledged that "some involvement and
entanglement [between church and state] are inevitable," but stated that
"lines must be drawn." It held both statutes unconstitutional because they
promoted excessive entanglement.'
Since then, members of the Court have periodically criticized the
Lemon test as having been inconsistently applied and leading to fractured
opinions.6 ' At one point, Justice O'Connor proposed a modification of the
test in Lynch v. Donnelly. 2 That case involved a Christmas nativity scene
erected by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island as part of a winter display
in a private park. 3 Applying the Lemon test, the Court held that the scene
was constitutional because its purpose was primarily secular and the scene

53. STORY, supra note 4, at 601 (stating that the founders saw a bill of rights as "an important
protection against the unjust and oppressive conduct on the part of the people themselves").
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55. Id.
56. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000).
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 615 (1971).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 624-25.
61. See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2751 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing cases for the proposition that a majority of the
current justices have separately "repudiated the brain-spun 'Lemon test."').
62. 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
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did not impermissibly advance religion or create an excessive church-state
entanglement." In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor proposed that the
appropriate inquiry in Establishment Clause analysis is whether
government endorses religion. 5
The Court later applied the endorsement test in County ofAllegheny v.
ACLU," a case involving a nativity scene as well as a menorah and a
Christmas tree. 7 The nativity scene was situated on a courthouse grand
stairway and included the Biblical legend "Gloria in Excelsis Deo."6 8 The
other symbols were located outside another government building one
block away. 9 The Court applied the endorsement test, explaining that
under it, the government cannot "appear to take a position on questions of
religious belief. . . ,,""
The nativity scene was held unconstitutional
because of its "patently Christian message."' However, the menorah and
Christmas tree, with their accompanying "Salute to Liberty" sign, were
Constitutional because they merely recognized different religious
traditions without endorsing them. 2
Currently, the exact parameters of Establishment Clause protections are
a frequent subject of debate in the United States. 3 Some commentators
have viewed the endorsement test as modifying the effects prong of the
Lemon test,74 while others have seen it as a separate alternative to the
Lemon test.7 In deciding Establishment Clause cases, the Court6 sometimes
applies the Lemon test and sometimes ignores it completely.

64. Id. at 685.
65. Id.at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
67. Id.at 579-82.
68. Id.at 580.
69. Id at 581.
70. Id.See generally Paul L. Hicks, Comment The Wall Crumbles: A Look at the
EstablishmentClause: Rosenberger v. Vector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 98 W. VA.
L. REv. 363, 372-57 (1995) (discussing the Court's use of the endorsement test in Allegheny and
the continuing viability of the Lemon test.)
71. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601.
72. Id. at621.
73. See DREISBACH, supranote 3,at 159 (stating that questions about the constitutionality
of governmental religious expression continue and "are issues that... will always be with us
always.").
74. See, e.g., James M. Lewis & Michael L.Vild, A ControversialTwist Of Lemon: The
Endorsement Testasthe EstablishmentClauseStandard,65 NOTREDAMEL.REv.671,697 (1990).
75. See, e.g., Ashley Bell, Comment, "God Save This HonorableCourt" How Current
Establishment ClauseJurisprudenceCan Be Reconciled With The Secularization Of Historical
Religious Expressions,50 AM. U. L. REv. 1273, 1290 (2001).
76. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2860-61 (2005) (plurality opinion) (citing cases).
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The latest salvos in the debate are two recent Supreme Court cases,

McCreary County, Kentucky, v. ACLU of Kentucky 7 and Van Orden v.

Pery.78 Both involved displays of the Ten Commandments on public
property. By the time the McCreary County and Van Orden cases reached
the Supreme Court, various constituencies eagerly watched them to see
whether the Lemon test would be kept intact, refined, or eliminated.
Perhaps no constituency was completely satisfied. The justices were
closely divided, lining up on the same sides in each case, with the
exception of Justice Breyer, who made up the fifth vote to hold two
displays unconstitutional in McCreary County79 and another display
constitutional in Van Orden.'° In their main opinions and multiple
concurrences and dissents,"1 the justices advocated approaches to the
church-state relationship that range from a degree of separation under
which even the Texas monument would be unconstitutional 2 to allowing
public religious expression that favors the monotheistic religions of
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. 3
2. Recent Cases
a. McCreary County
The McCreary County case involved postings of the Ten
Commandments in modest frames along with other documents in the
courthouses of two Kentucky counties, McCreary and Pulaski, pursuant to
county resolutions." In each courthouse, the first display consisted only of
a frame containing the Ten Commandments. When the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged those postings under the
Establishment Clause, each county added additional documents that

77. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
78. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2854 (plurality opinion).
79. McCrearyCounty, 125 S. Ct. at 2727.
80. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2857.
81. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, on announcing the multiple concurrences and dissents, quipped,
"I didn't know we had that many people on our court." Verbatim, TIME, July 11, 2005, at 13.
82. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2890 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
83. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Founders intended to protect the three monotheistic religions). By
contrast, the McCreary County majority stated that the Founders intended to protect only
Christians, not members of all three monotheistic religions. But the majority also believed that
applying religious tolerance only to Christians is not appropriate in contemporary times. Id. at
2744-45.
84. Id. at 2728 (majority opinion).
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contained references to God, including a passage from the Declaration of
Independence and the national motto, "In God We Trust." 5 The Federal
District Court, applying the Lemon test, entered a preliminary injunction
on the ground that the displays lacked a secular purpose as evidenced by
the choice of documents mentioning God.86 The counties then undertook
a third try, surrounding the King James version of the Ten Commandments
with other documents, including the Magna Carta and a picture of Lady
Justice. 7 An explanatory document declared, among other things, that the
Ten Commandments were "the moral background of the Declaration of
Independence." 8
In the continuing lawsuit, each county stated that its purpose in erecting
the third display was educational: the counties wanted to "demonstrate that
the Ten Commandments were part of the foundation of American Law and
Government" and to educate the citizens about documents important in
that founding. 9 The district court again found that the counties' purpose
was religious and issued a supplemental injunction against the displays."°
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affrmed the decision.9 The
counties then petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari.92

The U.S. Supreme Court's majority opinion, written by Justice Souter,
was based on the displays' lack of the secular purpose required by the
Lemon test.93 The Court found the history of the displays particularly
revealing. Religious purposes surfaced throughout, although some were
later modified. For example, by the time the counties submitted their briefs
to the Supreme Court, the prior assertion that the Commandments were the
moral background for the Declaration of Independence was softened to a
declaration that "many of the Commandments... are compatible with the
rights to life, liberty, and happiness." Stressing that "purpose needs to be

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 2729.
Id. at 2730.
Id. at 2731. A citation to the King James Bible was later removed. Id. at 2731 n.6.
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2731.

89. Id.
90. Id

91. Id.
92. Id. at310.
93. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2733, 2745.
94. Id. at 2741 n.21 (citing Brief for Petitioners 10 n.7). At oral argument, Justice Scalia said
the notion that the Ten Commandments are the basis of the Declaration of Independence is
"idiotic." Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2877 n.9 (2005) (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia added, "What the Commandments stand for is the direction of human
affairs by God. That's what it stands for." Transcript of Oral Argument, Mar. 2, 2005, at 30-31.
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taken seriously under the Establishment Clause and needs to be understood
in light of context," the Court stated that an "implausible" claim of a
changed purpose should not prevail in court or among persons with
commonsense." Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the Kentucky displays were
unconstitutional. The remaining justices dissented.'
The Court stressed that references to sacred texts on public property
will not always be unconstitutional. For example, in the Court's own
courtroom*frieze, the figure of Moses holding tablets with a portion of
Hebrew text, along with other lawgivers, would pass constitutional muster
because it is unlikely to be perceived by an observer as "violating
'
neutrality in religion."97
b. Van Orden
The history of the Van Orden display differed markedly from that of
the Kentucky displays. At the Texas Capitol, the Ten Commandments
appeared on a six-foot high granite monument that had been on the
grounds for more than forty years by the time Van Orden brought suit.98
It had been paid for not by the state but by the Fraternal Order of the
Eagles, a civic organization," as part of an effort to combat juvenile
delinquency by promoting "civic morality."'" The Capitol grounds also
contain seventeen other monuments and twenty-one historical markers, all

memorializing secular persons or events. The stated purpose of the
monuments is to commemorate "the people, ideals, and events that
compose Texan identity."' ' Both the District Court and the Fifth Circuit
held that the Ten Commandments monument was constitutional under the
Establishment Clause."12

95. McCrearyCounty, 125 S. Ct. at 2741.
96. Id. at 2727.
97. Id. at 2741. The frieze is on the courtroom wall high above the normal line of sight. It
shows Moses standing with other lawgivers holding a tablet, on which portions of Commandments
six through ten, written in Hebrew, are visible. See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/north
&southwalls.pdf.
98. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 2870. However, to be eligible for membership in the Eagles, a candidate must
believe in a "Supreme Being." Id. at 2878 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). However, the state had selected the
site, and two state legislators were present at the dedication. Id. at 2858.
101. Id. at 2858 (plurality opinion) (citing Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. (2001).

102. Id. at 2859.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the Supreme Court's plurality opinion,
which was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 3 The Chief
Justice characterized Establishment Clause jurisprudence as having two
faces, "Januslike": one looks at "the strong role played by religion" in U.S.
history and requires that the state not exhibit hostility toward religion,
while the other "looks toward the principle that governmental intervention
in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom.., demanding
a separation between church and state.""' 4 Mentioning the Lemon test, but
stating that its factors "serve as 'no more than helpful signposts,"' the
plurality found the test inapplicable to the "passive" Texas monument.'0 5
Instead, the plurality considered the "nature of the monument and our
Nation's history."' l°
The plurality recognized that the Ten Commandments are religious, but
cited the historical acknowledgment of religion in the United States,
mentioning President George Washington's proclamation of a day of
thanksgiving for "the many and signal favors of Almighty God."'0 7 The
plurality also cited contemporary governmental acknowledgments of
religion, including the frieze appearing in the Supreme Court's
courtroom.'0 8 These accepted acknowledgments of religion show that
"[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with
religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause," wrote
the Chief Justice."° But the plurality also recognized that "there are, of
course, limits to the display of religious messages or symbols," citing a
prior Kentucky case, Stone v. Graham.' 0 Stone concerned a state statute
requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted in every public
classroom."' The statute had an "improper and plainly religious purpose,"
Rehnquist wrote, stating that Stone exemplified the Court's particular
vigilance "' in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in
elementary and secondary schools.""'" The plurality found the Texas

103. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858.

104. Id. at 2859.
105. Id. at 2861 (citation omitted); but see id. at 2896 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Texas monument is not passive).
106. Id.

107. Id.at 2861.
108. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2862; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
109. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863.
110. Id. at 2863 (citing Stone v Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2863-64 (citation omitted). But see id. at 2896 (Souter, Stevens, & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting) (stating "our numerous prior discussions of Stone have never treated its holding as

restricted to the classroom").
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monument to be a "far more passive" use of the Commandments, one that
had a "dual" significance, both religious and nonreligious." 3 Therefore, it
did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, but called Van Orden a
"borderline case.""' 4 Stating that there is "no single mechanical formula"
that would resolve every Establishment Clause case, Breyer wrote that the
Texas monument has both a religious and a secular message."' But the
circumstances of its placement at the Capitol and the surrounding secular
monuments suggest, Breyer said, that the secular aspects of the monument
predominate." 6 Moreover, the passage of forty years without a challenge
indicated that observers had not thought the monument showed any
significant governmental favoritism of religion." 7 Indeed, Breyer said,
requiring removal of the monument would constitute "hostility toward
religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions," thereby
causing "the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.""' Emphasizing his disagreement
with the plurality's analysis, Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment." 9
The remaining justices dissented. 20
Significantly, two dissenting justices pointed out that by choosing the
King James version of the Ten Commandments and numbering them as
most Protestant denominations do, the governments in McCreary County
and Van Orden implicitly took a side in religious debates.' 2' The
numbering of the Commandments is important because they are not
numbered in the Bible, 22 and religious groups have numbered them

113. Id. at 2864. But cf. id.at 2896 (Souter, Stevens, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (stating that
"placing a monument on the ground is not more 'passive' than hanging a sheet of paper on a wall
when both contain the same text to be read by anyone who looks at it.").
114. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. Id. at2868.
116. Id at 2870.
117. Id.

118. Id. at 2871. See Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 471,477 (1998) (explaining that the Framers were "deeply concerned about the perils
of religious conflict," and opposed establishment not out of hostility to religion, but "to free it from
the temptations of secular power.").
119. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2872.
120. Id.

121. Id. at 2873-74, 2879-80 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
122. Lubet, supranote 118,at 474-75. See also Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on
the CourthouseLawn andElsewhere,73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1487-90 (2005) (explaining that
Catholic, Lutheran, and Jewish numbering of the Commandments differs from that of most
Protestants in a theologically significant way).
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differently to emphasize points of theological significance.123 Translations
of the Commandments also differ meaningfully. Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg pointed out that, for example, the Jewish version of the
Commandments states "You shall not murder," while the King James
version says, "Thou shalt not kill." Far from being trivial, this difference
4 Thus the monument projects "an
reflects "a deep theological dispute."'
125
message.'
inherently sectarian
3. Effect of McCreary County and Van Orden on Establishment

Clause Jurisprudence
a. No Major Change in the Analytic Framework
The Van Orden decision is the frst case in which the Supreme Court
has approved the posting of the Ten Commandments on public property.
In its result, then, Van Orden has expanded allowable religious expression.
But in terms of the analytic framework, the McCreary County and Van
Orden cases have not changed Establishment Clause jurisprudence
significantly, if at all. The two cases are consistent on certain key points.
Both named government neutrality as a guideline of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. The McCreary County decision referred to "the importance
of neutrality as an interpretive guide,' 26 and the Van Orden plurality cited
with approval "'the very neutrality that the Establishment Clause
requires."", 12' A majority of the justices explained that neutrality means
government cannot favor religion over nonreligion or one religion over
another. 128 Notably, though, the Van Orden plurality may have rejected
123. See Finkelman, supra note 122, at 1488-89 (stating that "there is no such thing as a
neutral or nonsectarian translation" of the Ten Commandments). Id at 1484.
124. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2880 n.16 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). However,
Justice Scalia wrote, "Idoubt that most religious adherents are even aware that there are competing
versions with doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not)." McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of
Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2762 n.12 (2005) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
125. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
126. Id. at 2742.
127. Id. at 2860 (citation omitted). But see McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750 (Scalia, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating, "How can the Courtpossiblyassert that the First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and nonreligion... ?").
128. McCrearyCounty, 125 S. Ct. at 2742 (stating that the government may not favor one
religion over another, or religion over irreligion); id. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that the government "may not prefer one religion over another orpromote religion over nonbelief');
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating, "The Court has
made clear.., that government must... 'effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and
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this definition, although the language it rejected was broader,
encompassing "any and all government preference for religion."'29
The Lemon test also remains viable, at least to some extent. The
McCrearyCounty majority relied on its purpose prong. 30 The Van Orden
plurality chose not to rely on the Lemon test and expressed some
tentativeness about it, suggesting that its fate is uncertain, but it did not
discard it.' 3' Nor did the fifth member of the Van Orden majority, Justice
Breyer. He based his conclusion that the Texas monument was
constitutional on the ground that its purpose, a factor that derives from
Lemon, was "mixed but primarily nonreligious."'3
Thus little if anything about the analytic framework has changed.
Indeed, the McCreary County majority emphasized that, in the current
climate of religious divisiveness, "This is no time to deny the prudence of
understanding the Establishment Clause to require the Government to stay
neutral on religious belief...,,""' And Justice O'Connor stated in her
concurrence, "[W]e have kept religion a matter for the individual
conscience, not for the prosecutor or bureaucrat. At a time when we see
around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious
authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate" that
church and state are separate in the United States.'34 In fact, she noted,
separation has encouraged private religious expression to thrive, more so
than in other developed nations.'35 She concluded, "Those who would
renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must therefore answer
a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has served us so
well for one that has served others so poorly?"'36
However, fourjustices who dissented to the McCrearyCounty decision
stated that the case does modify precedent in two ways that "ratchet up the

nonreligion') (citations omitted).

129. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860 n.3 (stating, "we have not, and do not, adhere to the
principle that the Establishment Clause bars any andall government preference for religion over
irreligion.") (emphasis added).
130. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2732 (citing Lemon, 430 U.S. at 612).
131. Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2861 (suggesting tentativeness through the phrase '"whatever
may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence ... ").

132. Id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. McCreary County, 125 S.Ct. at 2745.
134. Id. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. (citing ROBERT FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLmCS IN AMERICA 28-29 (2d ed.

1999)).
136. Id.
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Court's hostility to religion."' 3 7 First, the dissenters said the majority
effected a change by examining legislative purpose not on its own but only
as seen through the eyes of the "reasonable observer."' 38 However, this is
not a new approach to the role of legislative purpose. It was previously
adopted by the Court in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU.'3 9 In applying the
endorsement test there, the Court evaluated purpose by considering "what
viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display."'"'
Second, the dissenting justices in McCreary County said the majority
added a new requirement that a secular purpose must "'predominate' over
any purpose to advance religion." 4 ' This is less a new requirement than an
inference from established law. As the McCrearyCounty majority stated,
the requirement of a secular purpose for government action would "have
no real bite" if, where a religious purpose predominates, an action could
be saved by an accompanying secular purpose, "no matter how trivial."'42
Indeed, when the Court has been faced with both religious and secular
purposes, it has at times found Establishment Clause violations. For
example, in SantaFe, which concerned prayer at school football games,
the Court considered proffered secular purposes-the promotion of good
sportsmanship and an "appropriate environment for competition"-but
held that the practice nevertheless violated the Establishment Clause
because the proffered secular purposes were shams. 43 The dissenting
justices in McCreary County saw no analytic connection between the
sham-purpose cases and the McCreary County holding that a secular
purpose must predominate,'" but the two concepts are not so distinct. In
Santa Fe, for example, there was probably some basis for the proffered
secular purposes, but the 45religious purpose predominated, making the
practice unconstitutional.

137. Id. at 2757 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J.,dissenting).
138. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2757.
139. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989) (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 596. See also Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-08 (2000)
(explaining that it is relevant whether the objective observer would perceive an endorsement and
holding that the observer would find one in Santa Fe based on an understanding that the school
district's purpose was to encourage prayer.).
141. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2757 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., & Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2736 n.13 (majority opinion).
143. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309.
144. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at2757 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J.,& Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
145. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

23

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. is

Thus Establishment Clause jurisprudence was not significantly changed
under the McCreary County and Van Orden decisions. It is the cases'
concurrences and dissents that proposed more dramatic changes.
b. Proposals for Change in Concurrences and Dissents
Callsfor a different test. Some justices have concluded that current

precedent provides no principled basis for deciding cases consistently,"
thus creating the appearance that cases are decided according to justices'
personal preferences. 47 Justice Scalia proposes a more permissive standard
that, he contends, would be capable of consistent application and comport
with "our nation's past and present practices."' 48 He would abandon the
neutrality principle, allowing a state to "favor [ ] religion generally, honor
[]God through public prayer and acknowledgments, or, in a nonproseltyzing manner, venerat[e] the Ten Commandments."' 49 He believes that such
public religious expression could appropriately favor the three
monotheistic religions. 150 He also maintains that the majority of the
American people want the government to be able to engage in some
religious expression. 5'
Justice Thomas would also adopt a different standard. He views current
precedent as too restrictive, permitting "even the slightest public
recognition of religion to constitute an establishment of religion."'52 He
would therefore abandon Lemon in favor of the coercion test,'53 which he
contends would implement the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause."54 Under that test, the Establishment Clause would be violated only
when the government requires a citizen to do something religious "'by
force of law and threat ofpenalty.""5 5 This standard would broaden the

scope of acceptable governmental religious expression.' 56 Under it,
146. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2751 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
147. McCreary County, 125 S.Ct. at 2751 (Scalia, J.,Rehnquist., C.J., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
concurring).
148. Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2864 (Scalia, J.,
149. Id.
150. McCreary County, 125 S.CL at 2753 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
151. 1d.at 2756.
concurring).
152. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2866 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
153. Id. at 2867 (Thomas, J.,
154. Id.

at 2865.
155. Id.
at 2890 n.35 (Stevens & Ginsburg, B., dissenting) (pointing out that the coercion
156. See id.
test would allow "explicit state endorsement of religion.").
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Thomas would find the Texas monument constitutional because passersby
are not forced to stop or even look at it: "[Iln no sense does Texas compel
petitioner Van Orden to do anything." '57 The Kentucky displays would no
doubt also pass this test. Thomas contends that it would provide a more
consistent guide than current precedent for distinguishing among
Establishment Clause challenges.'
It is worth noting that the Court has previously applied a coercion test,
but only as a threshold inquiry. In Lee v. Weisman,'59 which involved a
nonsectarian prayer by clergy at a public school graduation ceremony, the
Court found the practice so coercive that it was unnecessary to consider
the entire Lemon framework in finding it unconstitutional. 60 And in Santa
Fe, which involved prayer at public high school football games, the court
followed Lee in finding the prayer impermissibly coercive, explaining that
it was not necessary to inquire beyond coercion to resolve the case.' 6' In
both of these cases, then, the Court saw coercion as sufficient, but not
necessary, for finding an Establishment Clause violation. 62 Adopting
coercion as the sole test would considerably broaden the range of
allowable governmental religious expression.
Call to discardincorporationunderthe FourteenthAmendment. Justice
Thomas would also overturn sixty years of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to hold that the clause is not incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and, therefore, does not apply to the states. 63 If this view
were to prevail, the McCrearyCounty and Van Orden cases could not have
been brought. There would be no basis under the Federal Constitution to
challenge any state involvement with religion.
Arguments againstmore government involvement with religion.Other
justices oppose an expansion of allowable government religious
expression. The McCrearyCounty majority frankly agreed that "an elegant
interpretive rule to draw the line in all the multifarious situations is not to
be had," but said the principle of neutrality provides a good guideline.'

157. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. Id.

159. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
160. Id. at 586-87.
161. Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 317 (2000).
162. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 619 (Souter, Stevens, & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (stating that the

Court's precedents "simply cannot... support the position that a showing of coercion is necessary
to a successful Establishment Clause claim.").
163. Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring).
164. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2742 (2005) (majority
decision). See also Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
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And Justice Breyer suggested that an elastic standard can promote better
results than a bright-line rule, especially in a complex area like
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 6 - Moreover, two justices stated, "To
reason from the broad principles contained in the Constitution does not, as
Justice Scalia suggests, require us to abandon our heritage in favor of
unprincipled expressions of personal preference."'"6 Indeed, U.S.
areas of
jurisprudence relies on long-established elastic standards in 6other
7
law.
tort
in
standard
person
reasonable
the
as
such
the law,
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg pointed out that the coercion test would
allow government endorsements of religion such as a government
advertisement touting "Catholicism as the only pure religion.' 6'8 They also
found it "dubious" that the coercion test would result in a more consistent
jurisprudence, explaining that "coercion may be obvious to some, while
appearing nonexistent to others."' 69 Along with Justice Souter, and
contrary to Justice Thomas's conclusion, they suggested that the Van
Orden display is coercive: it makes its religious nature clear by putting the
word "LORD" in capital letters, stating rules about the Sabbath and not
worshipping other gods, and adding religious symbols.' The three
concluded, "It would therefore be difficult to miss the point that the
government of Texas is telling everyone who sees the monument to live
up to a moral code because God requires it," and that God is the God of
Christians and Jews.'' Justice Scalia also noted that justices have
disagreed about what constitutes government coercion under the
Establishment Clause.'72 Thus the coercion test is unlikely either to draw

that there is "no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every
case.").

165. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2743 (quoting founder James Madison's statement that
"it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the lines of separation between the rights of
religion and civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid collisions & doubts on nonessential
points," and citingLetterfromJ. Madison to R. Adams (1832), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION

107 (P. Kurland & R. Leiner eds., 1987)).
166. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
167. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 277 (2000).

168. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2890 n.35 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2893 (Souter, Stevens, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
171. Id.

172. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2761-62 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating, "The Court has in the past prohibited
government actions that.., apply some level of coercion (though Iand others have disagreed about
the form that coercion must take) ... ").
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a bright line in this complex area of the law 173 or to eliminate accusations
that judges decide cases according to their personal preferences. 74 In fact,
as Justices Stevens and Ginsburg pointed out, even the underlying choice
between the sides of the historical debate about75 the Establishment Clause
may be seen to involve personal preferences.
In response to the argument that the American people want to see the
government allowed more religious expression, 76 Justice O'Connor
replied that a key purpose of the Bill of Rights was to protect the rights of
the minority.177 She wrote,
[W]e do not count heads

before enforcing

the First

Amendment .... The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to

withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
78
the courts.

Significantly, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg pointed out that the Ten
Commandments can be freely posted by owners of nongovernmental
property, including churches, civic organizations, and private citizens.' 79
In light of this option, the justices who favor more governmental religion
expression provided little explanation of why it is so important to allow it.
Justice Scalia came the closest to addressing this latent question when he
cited "the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious believers in
being able to give God thanks and supplication as apeople with respect to
our national endeavors."18 0 But allowing the government to facilitate
religious practice in that manner would significantly expand what is
currently permissible under the Establishment Clause.

173. See Noah Feldman, The IntellectualOrigins ofthe EstablishmentClause, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 346,416-17 (2002) (urging caution in arguing for a coercion test because even at the time of
the founding there was no agreement about what constituted coercion).
174. Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2888-89 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
175. Id.
176. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2756 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
177. Id.at 2747 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id.(quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
179. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2890 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
180. McCreary County, 125 S.Ct. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Mark D. Rosen,
Establishment,Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CH.-KENT L. REv. 669, 676-77 (stating that
Justice Scalia apparently believes "public worship not only is an aspect of the individual's practice
of religion, but may be necessary for the country's welfare as well.").
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c. The Place of Founding History in the Debate
Both scholars and Supreme Court justices have cited history from the
founding period in an effort to plumb the meaning of the Establishment
Clause. Credible scholars have cited founding history to argue that the
government should be allowed either more or less religious expression.'
Among the justices, each side of the debate has accused the other of
misapprehending the founding history. 2 In light of these differing
viewpoints, the McCreary County majority concluded that "a record of
inconsistent historical practice is too weak a lever to upset decades of
precedent adhering to the neutrality principle."'8 3 Similarly, in their Van
Orden dissent, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg argued that, because the
early historical record is "too indeterminate to serve as an interpretive
North Star," the inquiry should go beyond the founding history: "We serve
our constitutional mandate by expounding the meaning of constitutional
provisions with one eye towards our nation's history and the other fixed
on its democratic aspirations."'"

III. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

Establishment is a contextually defined word that has different
connotations in England than in the United States. The two countries share
common historical, legal, and religious roots. Yet they took radically
different paths at the time of the founding of the United States, when
England retained establishment while the fledgling country repudiated it.
Over time, the connection between Church and State in England has
diminished;8 what remains is relatively unproblematic precisely because
it has existed for such a long time and thus goes unnoticed. Meanwhile,
debates in the United States concern whether there should be more

181. Feldman, supra note 173, at 353 (citing scholars who cited history to argue each
position).
182. For example, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas contended that Justice Stevens and
Ginsburg relied on the wrong historical sources in support of their view. McCreary County, 125
S. Ct. at 2754 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justices Stevens and

Ginsburg found one of Justice Scalia's conclusions "unmoored from the Constitution's history,"
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2886 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
183. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2744 n.25.
184. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2888-89 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
185. See James W. Torke, The English Religious Establishment, 12 J.L. & RELIGiON 399,411
(1995-96) (citation omitted) (reporting the diminishing connection between church and state in
England).
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governmental religious expression. Thus the two countries' establishment
debates today revolve around different issues.
There are some similarities between the two countries' approaches to
church-state issues. Both allow some governmental religious expression
that has become part of the cultural fabric. In England, the long history of
establishment and of a close relationship between the Church of England
and the British State means that some of the most noticeable religious
expressions are not generally perceived as implying a particular state
stance towards religion or any coercion. In the United States, some
government acknowledgments of religion are constitutionally acceptable;
the Van Orden monument is a prominent example of this.
Both countries allow churches a great deal of autonomy from state
interference. In England, state authorities retain some jurisdiction over the
established Church, but it is rarely exercised. Still, that jurisdiction has
symbolic value because it clarifies that English establishment is not the
same as clerical rule or the imposition of particular beliefs or behaviors.
Establishment is seen as placing an obligation on the Church of England
to operate in a way that reflects multi-faith nature of British society. Thus,
one could say that England has an established church but not an
established religion. Meanwhile, in the United States, the reluctance of the
courts to interfere with church matters is based on the Free Exercise
Clause, 86 which also forbids the imposition of particular beliefs. A case
like DenbighHigh School would thus be analyzed under the Free Exercise
Clause, not the Establishment Clause." 7 Although England has no written
counterpart to the Free Exercise Clause, the Court of Appeal in Denbigh
High School articulated a principle similar to free exercise protection when
it based its decision on the importance of the individual conscience as part
of religious freedom.'
But there are also some key differences in the two countries' current
approaches to church-state issues. None of the three English cases
concerns a positive step by government to engage in a religious practice.
It is unlikely that a government body would attempt to introduce a new
religious practice in the current climate that so emphasizes diversity. The
idea, for example, of prayers before a school sports event would be as

186. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free
Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1633, 1633 (explaining that
"[g]ovemment action designed to thwart religious exercise is, of course, unconstitutional.").
187. See Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 306 (Or. 1986) (applying the Free
Exercise Clause to a public school teacher's challenge to a statute restricting her ability to wear
religious dress in school).
188. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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inconceivable as the Ten Commandments in front of a courtroom. To be
sure, some state religious expression is part of the English cultural fabric.
For example, a law provides that state-supported nondenominational
collective worship,"' which is to be
schools must provide a daily "'act of
"of a broadly Christian character."' 89 However, as few as 25% of schools
actually comply with this requirement, and its enforcement is not a
priority, largely because a significant number of the authorities charged
with its enforcement do not agree with it.'" And parents have the right to
opt their children out of such acts of worship. Thus, the cultural relevance
of this legislation is minimal.' 9' Most English people probably do not even
know that the law exists, which explains the lack of move to repeal it.
Meanwhile, the McCreary County and Van Orden cases did involve

affirmative steps by the government to engage in more religious
expression.
Thus, if there is a continuum between establishment and
disestablishment, the two countries are moving along it in different
directions. The three English cases, taken together, inch away from the
establishment side. While the R v. Bishop of Stafford holding was based
partly on establishment, the other two cases moved away from
establishment. The holding that Muslim dress is acceptable in a
government-funded school reinforces not establishment but the diversity
that has become the hallmark of modem England. The holding that the
Parochial Church Council is not a governmental body but a private one
illustrates a degree of separation between church and state. English
establishment implies public visibility of religion, but, crucially, gives the
role of achieving that to the national Church rather than to the government.
This gives the church greater autonomy than it formerly had 92 while
freeing up government not to have to engage in the promotion of
religion-and government promotion of religion may well appear more
coercive than Church promotion of religion. This is perhaps one of the
important conceptual implications of Aston Cantlow-that a Church
Council is not a governmental authority, despite its legal powers.

189. Torke, supra note 185, at 426.
190. See Office for Standards in Education, An Evaluation of the Work of Standing Advisory
Councils for Religious Education, at http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/publications/index.cfin?fuseaction
=pubs.summary&id=3756.
191. But see Ann Blair, Negotiating Conflicting Values: The Role of Law in Educating For
Values in England and Wales, 14 EDUC. &L. 39-56 (2002) (arguing that the privileged position of

Christianity in schools undermines their neutrality.).
192. Torke, supra note 185, at 410.
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Low church attendance in England 93 means that there is a genuine
diversity with no particular majority among active believers and no push
for the government to become more actively involved in religious
expression. Indeed, candidates for office would find little political
advantage in promoting further government entanglement with religion.
People expect the government to remain aloof and the Church to remain
sensitive to diversity and noncoercive in its approach.' 94
At the same time, a movement for more governmental religious
expression in the United States has been embraced by some of the
Supreme Court justices. In holding for the first time that the Ten
Commandments may be posted on government property, five justices have
moved away from the disestablishment end of the continuum. Language
in the Van Orden plurality opinion signals a desire by some justices to
allow more even governmental religious expression, as do the McCreary
County dissents. 95 Further forays in that direction would create an ironic
result, with the newer country moving closer to establishment just as the
older one moves away from it.
IV. CONCLUSION

England's established religion was one of the reasons many colonists
left England to settle in the United States. Since that time, England has
relaxed the reins of establishment, as illustrated in two of three recent
cases. At the same time, cultural forces in the United States urge more
government involvement with religion. The recent Van Orden decision
allowing posting of the Ten Commandments on government property
illustrates this, as do several justices' concurrences and dissents in the two
recent Ten Commandments cases. These developments are somewhat

ironic in light of the differences between the two countries when the
United States was founded.

193. Figures on active religious participation in the United Kingdom would suggest that, ifthe
UK approach to establishment is intended to be coercive, it fails rather spectacularly. See
Comparison of Church Attendance Trends in the UK and Australia, at http://www.cra.org.au/
pages/00000063.cgi (last visited Aug. 30, 2005) (reporting that Sunday church attendance in the
United Kingdom had declined to 7.4% of the population by 1998).
194. See, for example, the notorious occasion where Prime Minister Tony Blair was
interrupted by his public relations-aware communications advisor, Alistair Campbell at a press
conference, on being asked by an American journalist about his faith, with the words "We don't
do God." Roger Childs, Blending Politics andReligion, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/3301925.stm (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
195. See supra notes 147-58 & 163 and accompanying text.
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